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Book Reviews
The Uses of Pessimism: A Review Essay
Scruton, R. (2010). The Uses of Pessimism and the Danger of
False Hope. New York: Oxford University Press, $29.95
(hardcover).
Roger Scruton is an eloquent proponent of local tradition and culture, empowerment of families and communities,
curbing the tendency of bureaucratic-professional agencies to
undermine and substitute for natural helping systems-the capacity of families and communities to care for and control their
own members. Put like this, his position seems not dissimilar
to that associated with restorative justice, family group conferencing, community-centered social work on the British patch
model, McKnight's (1996) critique of the bureaucratic-professional "careless society," and other approaches to empowerment or partnership practice.
Scruton, however, is Britain's leading conservative intellectual, author of more than thirty books, on subjects ranging
from technical and introductory philosophy, fox-hunting (a
spirited defense) and animal rights, music, wine, and autobiography, to cultural critique and defense of English tradition
and country life. His very achievements are not ones likely to
endear him to most readers of this journal, I suspect, but I want
to suggest that his work merits serious consideration by those
involved in social welfare.

Unscrupulous Optimism
In his recent meditation on the uses of pessimism, Scruton's
concern is with the dangers of false hope (his subtitle) and the
particular fallacies that make such "unscrupulous optimism"
so powerful and impervious to reason. Among the fallacies he
considers are the Best Case (i.e., failure to consider worst-case
scenarios), Planning, Utopian, and Zero-Sum (I fail because
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you succeed) Fallacies.
In the abstract, these are useful cautions that no one sensibly could dismiss out of hand. But Scruton aims to show how
these fallacies are endemic to a larger social and political vision
that has been ascendant since the Enlightenment and especially the deadly triumph of "Reason" in the French Revolution.
That vision of Reason rests on an unscrupulous optimism that
sweeps away the collective problem-solving of generations
codified through customs, traditions, and laws built from the
bottom up, like English and American common law or Swiss
political arrangements. It replaces that common, inherited
wisdom with the will of the radical and enlightened few. The
utopian or planning elites sweep aside all previous traditions
and practices, along with the wishes of ordinary people, who
have to be led to a higher level of wisdom by the progressive,
forward-looking vanguard.
The force of Scruton's argument lies in the detail and concreteness with which he specifies these dangers in every aspect
of life, not only in totalitarian regimes like Nazi Germany or
the Soviet Union, but also as destructive forces in the democratic West. He points to the violence and destructiveness of
French and Russian revolutionaries, to how the first act of such
revolutionary elites is to destroy all the institutions of the old
society and especially the rule of law that might hold them
accountable.
But he also describes the bizarre grip of the EU bureaucracy today on the once democratic and sovereign nations within
its orbit. He shows how hundreds of thousands of regulations
are issued at an accelerating rate by an unaccountable bureaucracy whose many mistakes cannot be rectified through democratic processes. Once adopted, those measures cannot be repealed by the nations involved. Scruton shows how brutally
the bureaucrats sweep away the customs and traditions of centuries, in the process destroying, for example, family farming
and the countryside of Romania. He describes how a European
directive requiring the presence of a qualified veterinarian
at every abattoir led to the closing of most local abattoirs in
England, requiring that cattle be taken much greater distances
to be slaughtered, so that when disease did break out it spread
across the country instead of being localized.
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Another twist to Scruton's anti-utopian argument is that
the self-image of the progressive elite as more advanced than
the masses whose lives they want to manage, is itself illusory.
An important aspect of the book is the effort to explain these
fallacies' resistance to reason or evidence. They are, he argues,
residues of an earlier stage of human development, one that
still holds value in emergencies, but is destructive at other
times. There is an implied analogy here to the fight-flight response-once essential for daily survival, but now dysfunctional as a pattern of intensified arousal in conditions that do
not require it.

Scruton appeals, in contrast to the kinds of thought-experiments of Rawls or Locke on which social contract theory is
built, to the nature of tribes or hunter-gatherer bands as they
actually existed. This was the long prehistory before conditions existed for the emergence of societies of unrelated strangers who found ways to live side by side through negotiation
and compromise in consensual communities ... or cities. In

a band of hunters and gatherers that was in constant danger,
pursuing and holding on to territory in the face of human and
other threats from the outside, survival depends on the collective 'I'-submission of all to the goals and strategy of a leader.
There is no place for worst case scenarios or competing approaches when the band must unite behind its leader or die.
The same is true in wartime-which is perhaps why utopias
like Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward or Plato's Republic are

deeply undemocratic and organized top down along more or
less military lines.
The tabula rasa vision of the human being-found in
notions of constructing a new "socialist man" or a new human
type or, in its weirdest manifestation yet, in a trans-human
type that is seen as replacing humans with cyborgs or a new
genetically engineered post-human species-casts aside those
compromises and constraints that previously shaped us. Such
indeed was the spirit of the Sixties, with concepts of freedom
that wrecked-at least for the poor-the institutions of marriage and fatherhood, social patterns of sexual restraint and
responsibility, and many other institutions and traditions that
reflected the collective wisdom of generations.
In Scruton's view, then, the fallacies he describes are rooted
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in the material needs of hunter-gatherer bands, where everything depends on the will of the chieftain-the leader's collective 'I' is at the same time the 'we' of the community. One
reason that the fallacies are so impervious to refutation is
that they are "not new additions to the repertoire of human
madness but the residues of our forefathers' honest attempts
to get things right ... thought processes that were selected

in the life and death struggles from which settled societies
eventually emerged" (p. 203). Liberal, optimistic, progressive thinking is not, from this perspective, an advance on the
ways and customs of the unenlightened masses, but a regression to more primitive ways of thinking. Scruton's purpose
is to defend the world of compromise and half measures,
love, friendship, irony, and forgiveness from the Pleistocene
mindset of the enlightened that would sweep them all away.

Empowerment in the Bureaucratic-ProfessionalState
Some of Scruton's most effective rhetorical shafts are aimed
at experts and professionals who, basing themselves on a stock
of knowledge and expertise that is largely bogus, usurp the
role of families and communities and undermine their capacity to resolve their own problems. In this respect his critique
is congruent with that of other critics of the bureaucratic and
professionalized social services. For example, in The Careless
Society, McKnight (1996) shows how competent communities
have been invaded and colonized by professionalized services-often with devastating results.
In this area, Scruton has a brief and provocative, though
less than nuanced, discussion of a typical child protection
scandal in the U.K. known as the Baby P. case, where a child
died who was already known to the authorities. The inquiry
that followed called for retraining social workers, more expertise, and more funding of services.
For Scruton the area of child welfare is one where the claimed
expertise of the professionals is phony. Citing Baskerville's
(2007) critique, Taken Into Custody, he says: "Examine their
expertise, however, and whence it derives, and you will discover a mish-mash of amateur sociology, left-wing dogma and
routinized anti-family rhetoric" (p. 174). The inquiry's recommendations reflect the diversionary tactic of shifting the blame
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to whatever can be readily blamed, to whatever responds to
blame. (He explains much anti-Americanism, within and
outside the United States, on this convenient displacement
strategy of transferred blame.)
His argument is that this kind of inquiry and recommendation ignores the real forces that created the modem problem
of child abuse. It is much easier to retrain social workers or
change their practices than to restore the institution of the
family. So what is needed, the experts averred, was "more of
us, more planning, more supervision, more ways of preventing this society-wide disorder through the intervention of a
benevolent state" (p. 173).
Citing figures from research in the U.K. to the effect that
children are vastly more likely to be abused fatally in the
homes of mothers with a live-in boyfriend or stepfather than in
an intact family, Scruton says, "Actually what Baby P. needed
was a father, and the smallest dose of pessimism would have
pointed this out" (p. 173). To think in this way, however, is
to run up against "one of the fundamental prejudices of the
time: the prejudice that the new forms of domestic life brought
about by easy divorce and the sexual revolution are unalterable and unquestionable. Child abuse is not a universal social
disorder, for which the state bureaucracy and its experts are
the cure. It is the direct result of the delegitimization of the
family, often carried out by those very experts. Meanwhile, the
state has connived in the dissolution of the marriage tie, and
has routinely subsidized, through the welfare system, the arrangements (including live-in boyfriends) that expose children
to danger" (pp. 173-174).
But what is the point?
Scruton's prose is witty, clear, and eloquent, always a pleasure to read even when one disagrees with him. His curmudgeonly tone comes from the bitter experience of a brilliant
scholar whose academic career in England was blighted for
most of its span because his colleagues found his views-those
of a Burkean conservative-unacceptable and too far beyond
the liberal-radical consensus of the academy (outside the sciences, anyway). The fury with which progressive thinkers
respond when the fallacies in their thinking are pointed out
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has been visited on Scruton's head in print and in the harshest
tones.
It is natural in these circumstances that he would conclude
that "the argument of this book is entirely futile. You may enjoy
it and agree with it, but it will have no influence whatsoever
on those whom it calls to account" (p. 3). How could he conclude otherwise after a lifetime of collegial abuse? (This is not
to deny the compelling case Scruton makes that the fallacies he
examines are indeed resistant to correction, without regard to
the author's personal experience.)
That perception of futility, however, as well as the large
scope of the argument compared with the modest size of the
book, creates its own limitations. Scholarly rigor, careful documentation of the examples and fair consideration of objections
and alternative arguments must seem hardly worth the trouble
since, in any case, those who comprehensively disagree with
the author will not themselves be open to argument.
So Scruton's dismissal of multiculturalism, progressive education, postmodern gobbledygook, and the like are witty and
a delight to read but do not seriously engage the advocates of
those follies. His account of how utopian notions of "education
for equality" in the U.K. succeeded only in destroying opportunity for gifted working-class children and ensuring as nearly
as possible that students did not learn anything, is fun to read.
His view of education experts with their "agenda that was uniformly egalitarian, child-centered and knowledge-averse" (p.
172) and their disastrous effects on education is scathing and
witty, but probably not compelling to an educationist.
Most seriously, Scruton pays little or no attention to the
most obvious questions his critique raises. Are tradition and
custom so benign? What about slavery or female genital mutilation or suttee? These are the standard questions raised about
multiculturalism and a cultural/moral relativism that regards
all cultures as equal (or equally deserving of respect). Since
Scruton has no time for such postmodern or politically correct
tendencies, it is surprising that he does not take greater care
to explain how his valuing of tradition addresses such questions. It is not that they cannot be addressed. English conservatives like Burke or Samuel Johnson supported the American
Revolution and opposed slavery without difficulty or inconsistency. But Scruton does not take the trouble to anticipate such
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objections or explain his position to skeptical readers.
But the curmudgeon stance makes it too easy for critics to
dismiss the book as a partisan rant. That is a shame. Scruton is a
brilliant author-philosopher of ethics and aesthetics, critic of
music, art, and architecture, commentator and polemicist-of
extraordinary depth and range. His work challenges received
wisdom in the social sciences and humanities. His critiques,
even when lacking the full apparatus of German scholarship,
are serious attempts to offer a coherent and comprehensive alternative to the dominant thinking in the academy, arts, and
media.
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James Midgley & Amy Conley (Eds.), Social Work and Social
Development: Theories and Skills for Developmental Social
Work. New York: Oxford University Press (2010). $45.00
(hardcover).
This book is a timely and important addition to the field of
social work. Edited by James Midgley (one of the great minds
in the field) and Amy Conley, the book offers a distinctive approach to the professional social work which is informed by
an interdisciplinary perspective-developmental social work.
Like many scholars in the field, Midgley and Conley acknowledge the complexity of the paradigm and lack of a global definition. The book argues for the relevance of the paradigm in
social work practice. The central idea presented is that developmental social work has positive implications for the profession of social work and the clients it's mandated to serve. The

